Pomerantz LLP filed a federal securities class action against Lucid Motors, alleging the EV maker and two C-level executives concealed a supplier defect that halted Gravity SUV deliveries for 29 days during the first quarter — while publicly touting improved manufacturing and delivery capabilities.
The complaint, filed in the US District Court for the Northern District of California, names Interim CEO Marc Winterhoff and CFO Taoufiq Boussaid as co-defendants, along with the company.
The lawsuit alleges violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Plaintiff Izogie Osaro Eke filed the suit on behalf of all investors who purchased Lucid securities between February 25 and April 13, 2026 — a period during which, the complaint argues, the defendants made materially false and misleading statements about the company’s operations when the Gravity disruption was already underway.
Gravity Ramp
The Gravity has been central to Lucid‘s growth ambitions since the SUV first debuted with the higher-priced Grand Touring trim at $94,900. The Touring variant, launched last year, starts at $79,900 — excluding destination fees.
Despite having delivered only a small number of Gravity vehicles in the first half of the year, the EV maker reached a yearly total of 15,841 units in 2025.
According to data published by Cox Automotive, 12,614 of those were sold in the United States alone — with the Gravity accounting for 1,801 deliveries in full-year 2025.
Cox Automotive had reported that just five Gravity SUVs were sold in the US during the second quarter of 2025.
Lucid disputed the figures at the time, telling CNBC they were “completely inaccurate” and that Gravity deliveries were “already in the thousands.”
The SUV’s path to customers was rocky — the company delivered only a few units in 2024 before pausing shipments and resuming months later.
As exclusively reported by EV on April 2, 2025, the model faced continued delays, with early production hampered by safety issues, according to a person familiar with the launch plans.
Two months later, Winterhoff acknowledged publicly that the production ramp-up was “slower than desired,” even as customer feedback on the vehicle was “phenomenal.”
February: Delivery Halt
On February 12, and as first reported by EV, Lucid halted Gravity deliveries over a defective middle seat component that required physical replacement.
The news was reported by a user who was awaiting delivery, not by the company itself.
At the same time, the delivery pause came just days after Lucid‘s then-recently appointed SVP of Engineering and Digital, Emad Dlala, said the company had resolved up to 95% of the software issues that had plagued the Gravity since launch.
February 24–25: Q4 2025 Earnings
On February 24, Lucid reported its fourth-quarter and full-year 2025 results.
The class period begins the next trading day, February 25.
On the earnings call, Winterhoff told investors that “the ramp-up of Gravity gives us ample opportunity to further grow production and deliveries in 2026.”
He described the prior year as being “all about execution and strategy adjustment to set Lucid up for long-term success.”
Boussaid said the fourth quarter “marked a clear step change in throughput consistency, cost trajectory and financial visibility,” adding that Lucid‘s progress “reflects a more repeatable operating cadence heading into 2026” and that the gains were “not the result of temporary measures.”
In a 10-K filing published later on the same day, the EV maker wrote that they “have established strong relationships with suppliers and partners to deliver
the (…) Lucid Gravity.”
The complaint alleges these statements were misleading because the supplier quality issue had already disrupted Gravity deliveries earlier that month — with Winterhoff later confirming that February was when deliveries were “particularly hit.”
March 12: Investor Day
On March 12, Lucid held its inaugural Investor Day.
Despite the previously reported delivery halt — which remained unconfirmed by the company then — Winterhoff said during the event that the company was “applying increased scale, capital efficiency, and cost discipline” with “a clear and credible path to profitability and free cash flow.”
Boussaid described the company’s strategy as “designed for scale,” with “near-term progress driven by scaling Gravity.”
April 1: The Recall
On April 1, Lucid issued a physical recall affecting all Gravity vehicles built before mid-February, after discovering that some second-row seat belt anchors were not properly welded — a defect that could prevent the restraints from holding passengers in a crash.
The recall covered 4,476 units — nearly all Gravity vehicles produced up until then.
Lucid told the NHTSA the defect originated at its seat supplier, Camaco Automotive, which changed its manufacturing process without notifying or receiving approval from the company.
The supplier has since reverted to the original weld specification.
In December 2025, the company had also recalled 66 Gravity units over mislabeled front seat backrest covers that could prevent side airbags from deploying.
April 3: Q1 Delivery Miss
Two days later, Lucid disclosed that it had produced 5,500 vehicles in the first quarter of 2026 — but delivered only 3,093.
The figures came well below analyst expectations of 5,967 produced and 5,237 delivered.
By then, Lucid revealed for the first time that “deliveries of the Lucid Gravity were disrupted for 29 days due to a supplier quality issue with the second-row seats.”
Reuters reported the same day that deliveries were particularly hit in February, when Lucid paused to reverse an unauthorized supplier change and inspect vehicles already produced — which aligns with the recall notice.
Lucid‘s stock fell $1.13 per share, or 11.4%, over the two trading sessions following the disclosure, closing at $8.83 on April 7.
April 14: Capital Raise
On April 14, the company appointed Silvio Napoli as its new Chief Executive Officer after a 14-month search.
By then, Lucid also announced a $1.05 billion capital raise, including the increase of Uber’s investment in the company amid their robotaxi project, and PIF’s reinforced backing.
Part of it was also a $300 million public stock offering — which led shares to erase gains from the previous news and to fall another 4.8%, closing at $8.80.
The following day, TD Cowen cut its price target on Lucid to $10.00 from $19.00, citing the Gravity ramp disruption and a tougher-than-expected start to the year.
Year-to-date, and based on Monday’s closing price of $6.63, Lucid‘s stock plunged 37.1%.
Considering the past twelve months — which involve a 1-for-10 reserve stock split in late 2025 — the share price has dropped by 69.3%.
Adjusted for last year’s reverse stock split, the company’s shares are trading at $0.66 per share, well below Nasdaq‘s $1.00 minimum listing requirement.
By that time, Lucid‘s interim CEO had said that delisting fears were not the reason for the split.
May 5: Q1 Earnings Confirm the Damage
Lucid reported final first-quarter financial results on May 5, posting GAAP earnings per share of -$3.46 and missing consensus estimates by $0.83.
Revenue came in at $282.47 million, missing estimates by $76.04 million. The net loss exceeded $1 billion.
Winterhoff acknowledged in the press release that the “supplier issue during the quarter had an impact” and pointed to the need to “align production and delivery with customer demand.”
Boussaid said the company “ended the quarter with elevated inventory that we expect to convert to revenue and cash as deliveries normalize.”
Lucid said loss from operations reached $1 billion.
What the Lawsuit Seeks
The complaint alleges the defendants violated SEC disclosure requirements under Item 105 and Item 303 of Regulation S-K by failing to report the Gravity supplier disruption as a material risk factor and a known trend likely to have an unfavorable impact on financial results.
The case further alleges both individual defendants signed Sarbanes-Oxley certifications attesting that Lucid‘s 2025 annual report did not contain any untrue statement of material fact.
According to the lawsuit, both defendants have profited from selling shares of the company’s common stock during the class period.
“During the Class Period, Defendant Winterhoff sold 42,925 shares of the Company’s common stock, enriching himself by approximately $440,839,” the document read.
Additionally, “Defendant Boussaid sold 20,051 shares of the Company’s common stock, enriching himself by approximately $205,924.”
The suit seeks damages, prejudgment and post-judgment interest, attorneys’ fees, and a jury trial.
